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This article considers the issue of an oral arbitration agreement in relation to the
New York Convention. As Townsend once said “[a]rbitration offers a means to
an end, and the end is to the resolution of disputes.”1 This end would be extremely
difficult to achieve without the approval of national courts. Fortunately, with 146
signatory countries signed on the New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 1958 (The New York Convention), the success
of this Convention has attracted businessmen into using arbitration to resolve their
disputes. Nevertheless, a voluntary arbitration cannot be commenced without a
valid arbitration agreement. Setting out to achieve harmonisation in the enforcement
of arbitration agreements, art.II of the New York Convention provides the written
requirements to be followed by all 146 signatory countries. Accordingly, written
requirements for arbitration are imposed upon all signatory countries and they are
obliged under the convention to recognise all arbitration agreements which are
made in writing. Article II reads:
“1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing;
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any
differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not,
concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.
2. The term ‘agreement” in writing shall include an arbitral clause in
a contract or an arbitration agreement, signed by the parties or
contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams.”
However, in reality, it is acknowledged that form requirements are not always
followed or reflected in business practice. As Lew and Mistelis pointed out that:
“While in certain areas of trade parties often rely on oral agreements, strict
form requirements can defeat an agreement to arbitrate, the existence of which
is beyond doubt. It has been criticised correctly that the parties can orally
agree a page multi-million dollar contract which will be considered to be
valid but for the arbitration clause. The arbitration agreement would be invalid
1 John Townsend, “Quo Vadis Arbitration?” in Albert Jan van der Berg (ed.), 50 years of the New York Convention
- ICCA International arbitration Conference, (Wolters Kluwer, 2009), p.636.
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irrespective of whether it can be established that the parties actually agreed
on arbitration. A party can enforce the substantive provisions of a contract
while being able to walk away from the agreement to arbitrate concluded at
the same time.”2
To address this issue, increasingly one has witnessed the trend in abandoning the
strict written requirements imposed by art.II of the New York Convention and
moving towards the recognition of arbitration agreements which are not subject
to formalities. This is especially the case since the amendments were made to the
UNCITRAL Model Law (The Model law) in 2006 which is followed by some
national arbitration laws.
Starting from the amendments made to art.7 of the UNICTRAL Model Law
and s.7(1) of the New Zealand Arbitration Amendments Act in 2006, a major
change effected by s.4 of the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 and art.1507 of the
new French Arbitration Law 2011 (The French Arbitration Law 2011) has seen
New Zealand, Scotland and France relax their grips on arbitration agreements over
the issue of formalities required for a valid arbitration agreement. This so-called
liberal step has caught the eyes of international academics and practitioners as it
appears to be contradictory to the arts II and IV of the New York Convention
which has laid down the legal framework for recognition and enforcement of
convention awards since 1958.
In the case of Scotland, s.4 of the Arbitration (Scotland) Act 2010 provides that
“[a]n ‘arbitration agreement’ is an agreement to submit a present or future
dispute to arbitration (including any agreement which provides for arbitration
in accordance with arbitration provisions contained in a separate document).”
One year later, similar wordings appear in the new French Arbitration Law 2011.
According to art.1507 of the New French Arbitration Law enacted on January 13,
2011 (Le Décret du 13 Janvier 2011, Le Nouveau Droit Francais de l’Arbitrage),
in the case of international arbitration, no formality is required as far as arbitration
agreements are concerned. Article 1507 reads: “An arbitration agreement shall not
be subject to any requirements as to its form.”
However, this “liberal step” is rather different from the requirements practiced
in the majority of jurisdictions and international conventions which require written
formalities to be fulfilled in order to ascertain the parties’ wishes to subject their
dispute to arbitration as seen in s.5 of English Arbitration Act 1996 which states
that:
“The provisions of this Part apply only where the arbitration agreement is in
writing, and any other agreement between the parties as to any matter is
effective for the purposes of this Part only if in writing”,3
as well as art.II(1) of the New York Convention mentioned above.
It is clear that New Zealand, France and Scotland have abandoned the written
requirements for arbitration agreements laid down in the New York Convention.
The immediate question is whether these jurisdictions have moved too fast for the
2 Julian M. Lew and Loukas A. Mistelis, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law
International, 2003), para.7-8.
3English Arbitration Act 1996 s.5(1)
69
(2012) 32 C.J.Q., Issue 1 © 2012 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited
purpose of the New York Convention. Although it is accepted that the New York
Convention leaves a number of matters to be determined by municipal laws,4 the
issue concerning the formalities of arbitration agreements may not be one of them.
Such issue is dealt with in art.II of the Convention with an intention to provide an
internationally accepted standard. Under the duties associated with the ratification
of the Convention, the standard contained in the NewYork Convention is supposed
to supersede the relevant provisions of municipal law. Article II is no exception.
However, a survey of the arbitration laws of 90 jurisdictions5 which implement
the New York Convention has revealed that the requirements imposed by art.II of
the New York Convention and the relevant provision of domestic arbitration
legislations are different. This situation is not only limited to the implementation
of art.II but also art.IV which requires the party relying on an award to seek
recognition and enforcement of the award in another signatory country to supply
the enforcing court with the arbitration agreement or a certified copy of it. Clearly
this situation is against the intention of the New York Convention and its aim to
have consistent jurisprudence when the Convention was introduced.
The purpose of this article is to highlight this issue and seek potential resolution
within the NewYork Convention and the suggested Hypothetical Draft Convention
2008 by examining the issue of oral arbitration agreements and the discrepancy
existing in adapting the written requirements imposed by arts II and IV of the New
York Convention among different jurisdictions.With the scope of research limited
to oral arbitration agreements, the first part of the study will highlight the
importance of arbitration agreements and the discrepancy in implementing arts II
and IV of the New York Convention. It will be followed by an examination into
the impact of the written requirements which may have on the evidence required
for the application of recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. By applying
the “more favourable law provision” contained in art.VII, the question whether
the relaxation of written requirements on arbitration agreements in New Zealand,
France and Scotland has breached their duty under the Convention will be
examined. At the end of the research, the author will endeavour to answer the
question whether it should be the Convention or the municipal law setting the
requirements to be followed in the enforcement of arbitration agreements and, if
so, what level of requirements shall be imposed to resolve this discrepancy.
The importance of arbitration agreements
The importance of an arbitration agreement was highlighted by Lew and Mistelis
who stated:
“An arbitration agreement fulfils a number of different functions. First, it
evidences the consent of the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration.
Second, it establishes the jurisdiction and authority of the tribunal over that
of the courts. Third, it is the basic source of the power of the arbitrators. The
4Albert van der Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958. Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation
(Kluwer Law International, 1981), p.123
5The choice of the ninety jurisdictions is wholly made on a matter of availability of sources. The author’s intention
is to present the inconsistency between the Convention and all domestic laws of the signatory countries where possible.
However, with the full data is not possible for obvious reasons, a decision was made to look into all the jurisdictions
whose domestic laws are available on Kluwer arbitration and some arbitration laws translated by the author’s colleagues
based in other jurisdictions, such as Mauritius and some Latin American Jurisdictions.
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parties can in their arbitration agreement extend or limit the powers ordinarily
conferred upon arbitration tribunals according to the applicable national law.
In addition, the arbitration agreement establishes an obligation for the parties
to arbitrate.”6
Lawyers are acutely aware of the importance and significance a written arbitration
agreement represents in terms of evidence. The form requirements of an arbitration
agreement were understood to be strictly in writing when the NewYork Convention
was first introduced in 1958. The rationale of having arbitration agreements in a
written form is threefold. First, it is to ascertain the parties’ intention to subject
them to the jurisdiction of arbitration. In plain language, it is to ensure that the
parties actually agree to arbitration.7 Secondly, a valid written arbitration agreement
acts as a vital evidence to prove to the tribunal and the court that the parties have
elected to have their disputes resolved by the arbitral tribunal, rather than a court.
Thirdly, a written arbitration agreement would relieve the parties’ unnecessary
burdens in proving the existence and the contents of the agreement. This view is
shared by Redfern andHunter, who highlighted that most international conventions,
such as the New York Convention, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration (the Model Law),8 and Inter-American Convention9 all
contain relevant provisions imposing written requirements for arbitration
agreements because:
“A valid agreement to arbitrate excludes the jurisdiction of the national courts
and means that any dispute between the parties must be resolved by a private
method of dispute resolution, namely arbitration. This is a serious step to
take, albeit one that has increasingly become commonplace. Good reasons
exist, therefore, for ensuring that the existence of such an agreement should
be clearly established. This is best done by producing evidence in writing
…”.10
Moving away from no form requirements for arbitration agreements in both the
Geneva Protocol of 1923 and the Geneva Convention of 1927, the importance of
written arbitration agreement was addressed in art.II of the NewYork Convention.
Since its enactment of in 1958, one 146 jurisdictions have ratified the Convention.
With the ratification, art.II of the New York Convention has found its way into
the national arbitration laws of all of these jurisdictions. In theory, all signatory
countries should observe and implement the written requirements in its domestic
arbitration as art.II(1) intends to provide a uniform rule which “prevails over any
provision of municipal law regarding the form of the arbitration agreement in those
cases where the Convention is applicable.”11 However, the reality tells a different
story.
6Lew and Mistelis, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (2003), para.6-2.
7Lew and Mistelis, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (2003), para.7-7
8TheModel Law 1985 art.7(2). Its 2006 amendments contain two choices on the formalities of arbitration agreement
which will be discussed in the later section.
9Gary Born, International Commercial Arbitration (Wolters Kluwer, 2009), p.582
10Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, Redfern & Hunter on International
Arbitration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), para.2.13. Although they also pointed out that the trend in
modern national legislation has moved towards the relaxation of this formal requirement.
11van der Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958. Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation (1981),
p.173.
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Group One—the need for written arbitration agreements: the
majority view
In order to find out whether there is consistent jurisprudence in implementing the
written requirements of arbitration agreements imposed by art.II of the New York
Convention, a survey was carried out to examine the relevant arbitration laws of
ninety jurisdictions which include 87 signatory countries of the New York
Convention and three non signatory countries (Iraq, Sudan and Taiwan). The
survey reveals that the impacts of art.II can be seen in eighty three out of ninety
jurisdictions. These 83 countries all require arbitration agreements to be in writing
(see Chart One). They are: Algeria,12 Argentina,13 Australia,14 Austria,15 Bahrain,16
Bangladesh,17 Belarus,18 Belgium,19 Bermuda,20 Brazil,21 Cambodia,22 Canada,23
Chile,24 China,25 Colombia,26 Costa Rica,27 Croatia,28 Czech Republic,29 Denmark,30
Egypt,31 Finland,32 Germany,33 Greece,34 Guatemala,35 Hong Kong,36 Hungary,37
India,38 Iran,39 Iraq,40 Ireland,41 Israel,42 Italy,43 Japan,44 Jordan,45 Kenya,46 Kuwait,47
12The New Algerian arbitration law 2008 Law No.08–09 on the Code of Civil and Administrative Procedure arts
1008 and 1040.
13National Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure Law No.17.454 of September 19, 1967 arts 739, 740
14 International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) Act No.136 of 1974 as amended 2010 art.3.
15Code of Civil Procedure Pt Six, Chapter Four, Arbitration Procedure (in effect July 1, 2006) art.583
16Decree Law No.9 of 1994 with respect to the Promulgation of the Law on International Commercial Arbitration
Law art.1.
17The Arbitration Act 2001 (Act I of 2001) s.9(2).
18Law of Arbitration 1999 art.11.
19 Judicial Code, Sixth Part: Arbitration (adopted July 4, 1972 and last amended on May 19, 1998) art.1677.
20The Bermuda International Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1993, in force June 29, 1993 arts 2, 29.
21Law No.9.307 of September 23, 1996 arts 3, 4.
22The Commercial Arbitration Law of the Kingdom of Cambodia, adopted by The National Assembly Phnom
Penh, March 6, 2006 art.7.
23 International Commercial Arbitration Act, in force 1991 and current to October 8, 2004 art.7.
24Chile Law No.19.971 on International Commercial Arbitration art.7.
25Arbitration Law of The People’s Republic of China arts 16 and 22.
26Law 963 — 2005, arts 70, 71, 118, 119.
27Law No.8937, International Commercial Arbitration Law 2011 art.7(2).
28Law on Arbitration 2001 art.6
29Act No.216/1994 Coll., on Arbitral Proceedings and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards s.3.
30Danish Arbitration Act 2005 Act No.553 of June 24, 2005 on Arbitration s.7
31Law No.27 for 1994 for Promulgating the Law Concerning Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Matters, as last
amended by Law No.8/2000 (Official Gazette No.13, 4 April 2000) art.12.
32Arbitration Act (October 23, 1992/967, including amendments to June 27, 2003/689) s.3.
33German Arbitration Act 1998 (Book 10 ZPO) (The provisions refer to documents) arts 1029, 1031.
34Law 2735/1999—International Commercial Arbitration art.7(3).
35Decree Number 67–95 art.10.
36Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 341) 2011 s.19.
37Act LXXI of 1994 on Arbitration s.5(3).
38The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 (No.26 of 1996) ss.7(3), 44.
39The Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1997 arts 1, 7.
40 Iraqi Civil Procedure Code; Law No.83 of 1969.
41Arbitration Act 2010 (No.1 of 2010) s.2.
42Arbitration Law 5728—1968 s.1.
43Code of Civil Procedure, Book Four, Title VIII, Arbitration, Amended by Legislative Decree of February 2,
2006, No.40 art.808
44Arbitration Law 2003 Summary and art.13.
45Arbitration Law (Law No.31 of 2001) art.10
46The Arbitration Act, 1995—No. 4 of 1995 and s.9(1) of the Amendment 2009s.4(2).
47Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure (Law No.38 of 1980) art.184.
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Latvia,48 Lebanon,49 Libya,50 Lithuania,51 Luxemburg,52 Malaysia,53 Malta,54
Maritania,55Mauritius,56Mexico,57Morocco,58 The Netherlands,59Nigeria,60Oman,61
Pakistan,62 Paraguay,63 Peru,64 Poland,65 Portugal,66 Qatar,67 Romania,68 Russia,69
Saudi Arabia,70 Serbia,71 Singapore,72 Slovenia,73 South Africa,74 South Korea,75
Spain,76 Sri Lanka,77 Sudan,78 Switzerland,79 Syria,80 Taiwan,81 Thailand,82 Tunisia,83
Turkey,84 Uganda,85 Ukraine,86 UAE,87 England,88 USA,89 Venezuela,90 Vietnam,91
Yemen,92 Zambia93 and Zimbabwe.94
Taking a few jurisdictions as examples, art.16 of the Chinese Arbitration Law
1994 provides that a valid arbitration agreement not only has to be in writing but
also needs to contain other necessary information stipulated in second paragraph
of the provision before arbitration can commence. It reads:
48The Law of the Republic of Latvia, Civil Procedure Law Part D: Arbitration Court 1999 arts 492, 514.
49New Code of Civil Procedure (Decree-Law No.90/83) 1985 art.766
50New Draft Law on Arbitration 2009 art.583.
51The Republic of Lithuania Law on Commercial Arbitration - April 2, 1996 art.9(2).
52New Code of Civil Procedure arts 1224–1251 (1998)art.1250.
53Arbitration Act 2005 (Act 646) s.9(2).
54Malta Arbitration Act [Ch.387] 1996 ss.2, 29.
55Loi mauritanienne portant code de l’arbitrage (No 2000-06) art.6(1).
56 International Arbitration Act 2008 Act No.37 of 2008 art.4(1)(b).
57Code of Civil Procedure for the Federal District 2009 art.1423.
58Law No.05–08 Relating to Arbitration and Conventional Mediation arts 313, 327–347.
59The Netherlands Arbitration Act, in force December 1, 1986 and current to June 30, 2004 art.1021.
60Arbitration Amendment Act 2007 s.1(1).
61 Sultanati Decree No.47/97 Promulgating the Law of Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Disputes art.12.
62Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Ordinance 2005 — 2005
s.4.
63Law n° 1879/02 for Arbitration and Mediation 2002 arts 3, 10.
64Legislative Decree No.1071 Legislative Decree Regulating Arbitration 2008 art.13(2).
65Code of Civil Procedure Pt Five, as amended July 28, 2005 arts 1162(1), 1197(3).
66 Portuguese Arbitration Law N° 63/2011 of December 14, 2011 art.2(1).
67Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure 1990 art.190.
68Book IV, Code of Civil Procedure arts 340–370. On Arbitration (as amended by Law No.59 of July 23, 1993)
arts 343, 361.
69Law of the Russian Federation on International Commercial Arbitration 1993 art.7(2).
70Rules for the Implementation of the Saudi Arabian Arbitration Regulation 1985 s.6.
71Arbitration Act 2006 art.12.
72 International Arbitration Act Revised Edition 2002, incorporating amendments as at January 1, 2010, ss.2, 27.
73Law on Arbitration of Slovenia 2008 art.10(2).
74Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Act 1977 [South African]. No.40 of 1977 (Assented
to March 25, 1977.) Date of Commencement: April 13, 1977 s.1.
75Arbitration Act of Korea 1999 art.8(2).
76Consolidated Arbitration Law 2011 art.9(3).
77Arbitration Act No.11 of 1995 s.3(2).
78Arbitration Act of 2005 (Law No.15/2005) s.8.
79 Swiss Private International Law Act Ch.12: International Arbitration (and selected articles) 18 December 1987
art.178.
80Arbitration Act (Law No.4 of 2008) art.8.
81Arbitration Act 1998 art.1(2).
82Arbitration Act, BE 2545 (AD 2002), as in force from April 30, 2002 s.11.
83Arbitration Code (Promulgated by Law No.93-42), art.6.
84 International Arbitration Law (Law No.4686 of June 21, 2001) 2001 art.4.
85The Arbitration and Conciliation Act 2000 s.4.
86Law on International Commercial Arbitration 1994 art.7(2).
87Draft Federal Arbitration Law 2009,art.12.
88Arbitration Act 1996 ss.5, 100(2)(a).
89 Federal Arbitration Act 1925 s.2.
90Law on Arbitration 1999 art.6(1).
91Law 54 on Commercial Arbitration 2010 art.16(2).
92Law on Arbitration in Civil and Commercial Matters 2010 art.15.
93Arbitration Act, Government of Zambia Act No.19 of 2000 ss.2, 9, 30(1)(b).
94Arbitration Act 1996 art.7.
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“An arbitration agreement includes an arbitration clause included in the
contract, and an agreement on submission to arbitration that is concluded in
other written forms before or after the dispute arises.
An arbitration agreement shall contain the following particulars: an
expression of the intention to apply the following particulars:
(1) an expression of the intention to apply for arbitration;
(2) matters for arbitration; and
(3) a designated arbitration commission.”
In the case of England, s.5 of English Arbitration Act 1996 provides that Pt One
of the Act applies
“only where the arbitration agreement is in writing, and any other agreement
between the parties as to any matter is effective for the purposes of this Part
only if in writing”.95
Apart from stipulating the written requirements, the Act also provides an extensive
explanation what constitutes “in writing”.96 It stipulates:
“(2) There is an agreement in writing—
if the agreement is made in writing (whether or not it is
signed by the parties),
(a)
(b) if the agreement is made by exchange of communications
in writing, or
(c) if the agreement is evidenced in writing.
(3) Where parties agree otherwise than in writing by reference to terms
which are in writing, they make an agreement in writing.
(4) An agreement is evidenced in writing if an agreementmade otherwise
than in writing is recorded by one of the parties, or by a third party,
with the authority of the parties to the agreement.
(5) An exchange of written submissions in arbitral or legal proceedings
in which the existence of an agreement otherwise than in writing is
alleged by one party against another party and not denied by the
other party in his response constitutes as between those parties an
agreement in writing to the effect alleged.
(6) References in this Part to anything being written or in writing include
its being recorded by any means.”
Similarly, art.7(2) of the Chilean International Commercial Arbitration Law sets
out the written requirements of an arbitration agreement. The definition of “in
writing” requires an arbitration agreement to be in the form of an arbitration clause
in a contract or in the form of a separate agreement. It also covers an agreement
which is contained in a document signed by the parties or in an exchange of letters,
telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunication which provide a record of
the agreement, or in an exchange of statements of claim and defence in which the
existence of an agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by another.
Furthermore, the reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration
clause constitutes an arbitration agreement will also fulfil the written requirements
95English Arbitration Act 1996 s.5(1).
96English Arbitration Act 1996 s.5(2)–(6).
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providing that the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make that
clause part of the contract.97 This requirement is also upheld by the German Federal
Court which pointed out that the recognition and enforcement of the arbitral awards
can be refused if the parties had dispute over whether the form requirements are
fulfilled.98
Clearly, the survey shows that the written requirements stipulated in art.II of
the New York Convention are implemented by most surveyed jurisdictions. This
has not only rebutted van der Berg’s statement made at ICCA International
Arbitration Conference in 2009 that
“the written form required by Article II of the NYC for the arbitration
agreement is stricter than almost any national country of origin may import
parochial annulment”99
but also proven that the minimumwritten requirement as listed in art.II of the New
York Convention has firmly established in most jurisdictions. However, the survey
demonstrates a dichotomywhere some jurisdictions adhere to the minimumwritten
requirement as stated in art.II, whereas some jurisdictions impose further
requirements alongside the written requirements. For instance, art.16 of the Chinese
Arbitration Law 1994 imposes further detailed information than the written
requirement for arbitration agreement, such as parties’ express consent, the disputes
and designated arbitration institution. As nomechanism in place to stop jurisdictions
adopting more stringent requirements than those contained in art.II, failing to
observe those domestic requirements will lead to the invalidity of arbitration
agreement. Consequently, the intended effect of art.II can be limited. With more
stringent requirements in place in domestic laws, the influence of art.II NYC will
not prevent the possibility of annulments on grounds of lack of formal requirements.
Group Two—what need? No need for written arbitration
agreements: the minority view
Following the impacts of the invention of new technology on the formation of
arbitration agreements as well as the introduction of the UNCITRAL Model Law
on Electronic Commerce in 1996 and the United Nations Convention on the Use
of Electronic Communications in International Contracts in 2005, it is agreed that
an arbitration agreement can not only be made in traditional written form, but also
by telex, fax, email or an electronic communication which can be recorded.100
Although the majority of the jurisdictions surveyed in this study adapt the written
requirements, a minority group of jurisdictions have chosen to abandon written
requirements by claiming that written agreement is a thing of the past.101According
to the survey, 7 out of the 90 jurisdictions do not provide expressed statutory
written requirements. Among these seven jurisdictions, four countries; namely,
97Chilean Law No.19.971 on International Arbitration Law.
98This case was discussed in Lew and Mistelis, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (2003),
para.26-62.
99Albert Jan van der Berg, “Hypothetical Draft Convention on International Enforcement of arbitration Agreements
and Awards” in Albert Jan van der Berg (ed.), 50 years of the New York Convention - ICCA International arbitration
Conference (2009), p.649.
100Option 1 of art.7 of the Model Law provides: “An agreement is in writing if its content is recorded in any form,
whether or not the arbitration agreement or contract has been concluded orally, by conduct or by other means.”
101 See the later discussion on France, New Zealand and Scotland.
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Bulgaria, Norway, South Africa, Sweden are silent on this particular issue. Other
three jurisdictions, France, New Zealand, Scotland, offer express provisions
requiring no formalities for arbitration agreements. The changes brought into these
three jurisdictions can be traced back to The Amendments of theModel Law 2006.
Option II of art.7 of the Model Law
Option II of art.7 of the Model Law started the trend in removing the written
requirements imposed on arbitration agreements by art.II(1) of the New York
Convention. It reads:
“Arbitration agreement is an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration
all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them
in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not.”
The impacts of this Option can be seen in some recently enacted arbitration laws
below.
New Zealand102
New Zealand Arbitration Act 1996 s.2(1) allows an arbitration agreement taking
the form of an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain
disputes which have arisen or whichmay arise between them in respect of a defined
legal relationship. In its 1996 Act, the term oral arbitration agreement was not
expressly provided. However, in its later amendment in 2006, art.7(1) of the First
Schedule concerning the Rules became the first domestic legislation expressly
allowing oral arbitration agreements. It reads:
“(1) An arbitration agreement may be made orally or in writing. Subject
to section 9, an arbitration agreement may be in the form of an
arbitration clause in a contract or in the form of a separate
agreement.”
This provision was incorporated with an intention to ensure that New Zealand
remains up to date with international best practice as well as update Arbitration
Act 1996 (the 1996 Act) in order to reflect recent changes in art.7 of the
UNCITRAL Model Law in 2006 which introduces no written requirements for
arbitration agreements. This change justifies its choice of the Option II of the
amendment of theModel Lawwhich provides a more general wording, contrasting
with Option 1,103 that arbitration agreement is an agreement by the parties to submit
to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between
them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not.
The relevant provision accommodating the change made to the formality of the
arbitration agreements can also be seen at the stage of enforcement with the phrase
“if it is in writing” inserted with the reference to the issue of arbitration agreement
at the recognition and enforcement stages in s.35 of the Amendments Arbitration
Act 2006. It provides that if the arbitration agreement is recorded in writing, the
102However, Arbitration Act 1996 s.11(1)(c) and Arbitration Amendment 2007 s.5 provide that consumer arbitration
agreement has to be in writing.
103Option 1 of art.7(1) of the Model Law reads: “The arbitration agreement shall be in writing.”
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original arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy of the agreement has to be
submitted to the enforcing court. Clearly, this provision takes the reference to an
oral arbitration agreement stipulated in s.7(1) into consideration and allows the
possibility of an oral arbitration agreement at the later enforcement stage. In other
words, a written agreement is only required at the initial stage of arbitration
proceedings and at the final stage of recognition and enforcement of arbitration
agreement if it is made in written form. If not, arbitration proceedings can be
carried out on the basis of an oral agreement and an award can be enforced with
the production of the award only. Section 35 of the Arbitration Amendment Act
successfully avoids the potential conflicts arising from the applications of ‘no
written formalities’ stipulated in art.7 of the First Schedule of the Arbitration Act
1996 and art.IV of the New York Convention which expressly lists the documents
needed to be submitted to the enforcing court at the recognition and enforcement
stage.104
Scotland and France
This liberal move was followed by Scotland in 2010 and France in 2011. Though
abandoning its Model Law country status, Scotland decided to include Option II
of art.7 of the Model Law into its new arbitration law. Section 4 of the Arbitration
(Scotland) Act 2010 provides that
“[a]n ‘arbitration agreement’ is an agreement to submit a present or future
dispute to arbitration (including any agreement which provides for arbitration
in accordance with arbitration provisions contained in a separate document.”
Accordingly to this provision, there is no specific form required for a valid
arbitration agreement. It can be made in writing, oral and any forms which express
parties’ wishes to submit their disputes to arbitration. The recognition of both oral
and written agreements as a valid arbitration agreement is confirmed in the Policy
Memorandum which reads:
“At present Scots law generally recognises both oral and written agreements
to refer to arbitration. The policy of the Bill is that arbitration agreements
should continue to be recognised whether they are concluded orally or in
writing so that all arbitration in Scotland benefit from the provisions in the
Bill (Although the general law may require some arbitration agreements to
be in writing). If oral agreements were not recognised, they would continue
to be subject to the present unsatisfactory common law and would not benefit
from the provisions in the Bill.”105
The background of this provision follows the abolishment of proof by writ or oath
in s.11 of the Requirements of Writing (Scotland) Act 1995 according to the
recommendation made by the Scottish Law Commission.106Section 11 reads:
104The New York Convention art.IV provides: “To obtain the recognition and enforcement mentioned in the
preceding article, the party applying for recognition and enforcement shall, at the time of the application, supply: (a)
…; (b) The original agreement referred to in article II or a duly certified copy thereof.”
105Policy Memorandum (January 29, 2009) paras 70–71. Also Hong-Lin Yu, Commercial Arbitration —
International and Scottish Perspectives (DUP, 2011), p.41.
106WilliamW. McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland, 3rd edn (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2007), para.2-35–2-36.
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“Any rule of law and any enactment whereby the proof of any matter is
restricted to proof by writ or by reference to oath shall cease to have effect.”
As s.1 of the Act points out that, considering most promises made in the course
of business are not in writing, writing is only required for trusts, conveyances, the
making of any will, employment, consumer credit, package holiday, timeshares,
for a unilateral obligation for the creation, transfer, variation or extinction of a real
right in land; and for a gratuitous unilateral obligation, exception an obligation
undertaken in the course of business.107 Arbitration Agreements do not fall into
those categories, therefore they do not require to be in writing.
With oral arbitration agreements recognised as a valid form in which to submit
dispute to arbitration, potential disputes between the disputing parties over the
existence of an oral arbitration agreement has to be addressed, especially in the
case where one party denied the existence of the oral arbitration agreement. In
Scotland, the standard applied to prove the existence of an oral arbitration agreement
rests the application of “balance of probabilities”.108 The balance of probabilities
only requires the party “prove that the fact in question is ‘more likely than not,
even marginally so”109 hence, it allows both tribunal and the judges to decide
whether the party claiming the existence of an oral arbitration agreement can
convince them that an oral arbitration was reached between the parties from the
evidence provided by the parties. Furthermore, the party does not have to be
corroborated as long as the court feels confident to proceed with the case before
them.110 This standard does not impose upon the claiming party an absolute
undertaking or require him to prove the existence beyond reasonable doubts. The
claiming party only needs to prove 51 to 49 in favour of his claim then the standards
are satisfied. The standards applied are what Lord Brandon stated inRhesa Shipping
Co S.A v. Edmunds:
“The legal concept of proof on the balance of probabilities must be applied
with common sense. It requires a judge of first instance, before he finds that
a particular even occurred, to be satisfied on the evidence that it is more likely
to have occurred than not.. If a judge concludes, on a whole series of cogent
grounds, that the occurrence of an event is extremely improbable, a finding
by him that it is nevertheless more likely to have occurred than not, does not
accord with common sense. This is especially so when it is open to the judge
to say simply that the evidence leaves him in doubt whether the event occurred
or not, and that the party on whom the burden of proving that the event
occurred lies has therefore failed to discharge such burden.”111
Once the probabilities are established in the mind of the tribunal or the judges, the
tribunal will proceed with arbitration and the court will proceed with the
proceedings to recognise and enforce the agreement.
Being famous as an arbitration friendly country, France also joined this minority
group and removed the written requirements imposed by art.II of the New York
Convention. Article 1507 of the New French Law 2011 grants an oral arbitration
107Also see Fraser Davidson, Evidence (Edinburgh: W. Green, 2007), para.7.16
108However, the former law continues to apply to writings made prior to August 1, 1995.
109Miller v Minster of Pensions [1947] 2 All E.R. 372 at 374.
110 Taylor v Taylor 2000 S.L.T. 1419 at [14].
111Rhesa Shipping Co S.A v. Edmunds (The Popi M) [1985] 1 W.L.R. 948 at 956.
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agreement the same status as its written form in international arbitration. It reads:
“An arbitration agreement shall not be subject to any requirements as to its form.”
By confirming that an arbitration agreement is not subject to any condition of form,
this provision achieves its aim to consolidate art.1495 of the 1981 Decree and the
French case law in the matter of the form requirements of arbitration agreements.
With the development in the French, Scottish and New Zealand arbitration laws,
it appears that the traditional legal framework set up by the New York Convention
which imposes “in writing” requirement is under challenge. Clearly, this
development splits the jurisdictions of this survey into two groups; one group
requires arbitration agreements to be in writing and the other does not. Does this
situation indicate that these three jurisdictions move too fast and have gone beyond
the New York Convention Regime for recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards? To answer this question, further legal analysis will be made by two aspects;
namely, art.IV of the NewYork Convention, the national legislations implementing
this article and art.VII of the New York Convention.
The impacts of art.IV of the New York Convention on the form
of arbitration agreements
Article IV(1) reads:
“1. To obtain the recognition and enforcement mentioned in the
preceding article, the party applying for recognition and enforcement
shall, at the time of application, supply:
(a) The duly authenticated original award or a duly certified
copy thereof.
(b) The original agreement referred to in article II or a duly
certified copy thereof.
Article IV(1) is to set the evidential requirements procedures for recognition and
enforcement of New York Convention awards. The party relying on the award
and seeking recognition and enforcement of the award is required to provide the
enforcing court a copy of the award and a copy of an arbitration agreement.
Although the party is not required to prove the validity of the arbitration agreement,
the agreement referred to in art.II has to be submitted in the written form to fulfil
the procedural requirements for recognition and enforcement. This provision is
said to impose minimum formal requirements112 and shall prevail over stricter
national law in respect of convention awards.113
According to the second part of the survey examining how art.IV(1) is
implemented by the 90 jurisdictions, it was revealed that 69 jurisdictions require
the submission of the original arbitration agreement of a duly certified copy of it
along with the award when recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards is
sought. They are: Algeria, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Cambodia, Chile,
Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hong
Kong, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Latvia,
Lebanon, Libya (non-signatory country), Lithuania, Luxemburg, Malaysia, Malta,
112Lew and Mistelis, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (2003), para.26-58. A discussion of this
issue will be conducted in later section.
113Lew and Mistelis, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (2003), para.26-58
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Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, The Netherlands, Nigeria, Oman,
Pakistan, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Scotland, Serbia,
Singapore, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Sudan
(non-signatory), Syria, Taiwan (non-signatory), Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE,
Uganda, Ukraine, England, USA, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen and Zimbabwe.
Among them, 61 out of 69 jurisdictions requires the submission of arbitration
agreement and arbitral award as evidence, 8 other jurisdictions (India, Indonesia,
Latvia, Oman, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan and Yemen) require further documents as
evidence. Another 13 out of the 90 jurisdictions which are the signatory countries
of the New York Convention but do not list any requirements in the relevant
domestic arbitration laws.114 As they are the signatory countries of the New York
Convention, based on their convention duty, it is reasonable to assume that the
minimum requirements dictated by art.IV of the New York Convention will be
followed by those jurisdictions at the stage of recognition and enforcement
proceedings. The survey also finds that Iraq which is not the signatory country of
the NewYork Convention does not have specific provisions governing the evidence
to be submitted for recognition and enforcement. Hence, it would be difficult to
judge what documents the Iraqi court would require if the winning party would
like to enforce a foreign award. Interestingly, the survey shows that there are seven
jurisdictions which have less strict requirements than those listed in art.IV(1) of
New York Convention and do not require the original arbitration agreement or a
duly certified copy of it to be submitted as the evidence required for recognition
and enforcement of arbitral awards. They are: Costa Rica, Hungary, Japan, New
Zealand, Norway, Peru and Romania. For Costa Rica,115 Hungary,116 Japan117 and
Peru,118 only awards are required. In the case of New Zealand, s.35(1)(b) of
Arbitration Amendment Act 2006 provides that arbitration agreement is only
required if it is made in writing. For Norwegian courts, awards are required but
arbitration agreement may not.119 Finally, according to the Romanian law, art.171
does not require the arbitration agreement to be submitted but it goes beyond the
minimum requirements of art.IV and requires the party replying on the award to
provide: (a) the copy of the foreign decision; (b) the proof of its final character;
(c) the copy of the proof of the summons having been served and of the notification
act having been communicated to the party which was not present in the foreign
instance, or any other official act attesting that the party against which the decision
was given knew of the summons and the notification act in due time; and (d) any
other act to prove further that the foreign decision meets all the other conditions
under Article 167.120 (See Appendix Two).
From this survey, one can see that the minimum requirements suggested by Lew
and Mistelis and set in art.IV are not strictly complied by all signatory countries
of the New York Convention. Some jurisdictions have introduced fewer
114Argentina, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bermuda, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Iran,
Ireland, Spain, Sweden, Zambia.
115 International Commercial Arbitration Law Based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, Law 8937 of 2011, in effect
from May 25, 2011, Costa Rica, art.35.
116Act LXXI of 1994 on Arbitration, Hungary, s.60.
117Arbitration Law 2003, Japan, art.46(2).
118 Peruvian Arbitration Law arts 68 and 76.
119Arbitration Act of May 14, 2004, Norway, s.45
120Arbitration of Private International Law Book IV, Code of Civil Procedure arts 340–370 on Arbitration (as
amended by Law No.59 of July 23, 1993, Romania.
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requirements while others have introduced further requirements than art.IV intends
to have. This can be seen in the survey that 61 out of 90 jurisdictions set the similar
requirements as those listed in art.IV but the rest of the minority jurisdictions either
requires more documents to be submitted or simply waive the party the obligation
to supply the original arbitration agreement or a certified copy of it to the enforcing
court at the stage of recognition and enforcement.
Before moving on, one question which should be investigated is whether it
should be the minimum or maximum requirements introduced by art.IV. Suppose,
it is the minimum requirements art.IV wishes to introduce, what would happen is
that all signatory countries are allowed to add further required documents to the
list to be submitted the enforcing courts for recognition and enforcement as India,
Indonesia, Latvia, Oman Syria, Sudan, Yemen and Romania have done.
Consequently, a party who wishes to enforce the award will have to follow different
domestic evidential requirements to provide other documents along with the
required original copy of the awards and arbitration agreements or certified copies
of them. Putting the aim of harmonisation into this context, it is beggar’s belief
that Art.IV was introduced to set minimum requirements to allow domestic laws
to add further required documents to the existing list. On the contrary, the author
is of the opinion that art.IV was enacted to set the maximum requirements to be
followed by all signatory countries in order to harmonise evidential requirements
in all jurisdictions. Only such interpretation can reflect the jurisprudence of an
international convention. With the maximum requirements set, by means of ‘more
favourable law’ principle in art.VII of the New York Convention, national
arbitration laws will have the power to remove the required documents listed in
art.IV but not allowed to introduce further evidence required. Ideally, this should
be the practice art.IV would like to see, but clearly different requirements have
been applied by various jurisdictions. Hence, complication arises.
How complicate can it get with different requirements introduced
by national arbitration laws?
Combine these findings with the issue of the written requirements of arbitration
agreement imposed by art.II of the New York Convention, one can see that some
unnecessary complications may arise or may have already arisen at the stage of
recognition and enforcement. The party’s obligation of supplying the enforcing
court the original arbitration agreement or a certified copy of it under art.IV(1)(b)
of the NewYork Convention was upheld in various cases, such asChinaMinmetals
v Chi Mei.121 Such obligation raises the question of whether an oral arbitration
agreement is sufficient for the purpose of application for recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards. Generally, it is accepted that verbal acceptance is
insufficient under art.IV of the New York Convention.122
The difficulties associated with oral arbitration agreements can surface when,
occasionally, the party who wish to rely on the award to apply for recognition and
121China Minmetals materials Import and Export and Export Co Ltd v Chi Mei Corp 334 F. 3d 274.
122Dirk Otto, “Article IV” in Herbert Kronke, Patrik Nacimiento (eds), Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards: A Global Commentary on the New York Convention (Kluwer Law International, 2010), p.158. But
it may be recognised as a valid arbitration under art.VII of the New York Convention which will be discussed in the
next section.
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enforcement of such award may not be in a position to supply the enforcing court
the written arbitration agreement as required. There may be a situation where the
written arbitration agreement was destroyed, or one party commenced the arbitration
proceedings without producing a written arbitration agreement and the other party
participated in the proceedings without disputing the existence of the arbitration
agreement but later, at the enforcement stage, raised the issue of non-existence of
a written arbitration agreement. Alternatively, a case where a losing party to the
arbitral award participated the arbitration proceedings but objected to the
jurisdiction of the tribunal on the basis of the lack of written arbitration agreement.
It is doubtful that courts would uphold the existence of the arbitration agreement
in this scenario. However, a different conclusion can be reached if a respondent
decide to submit substantive claims and plead the opposite from the ones claimed
by the claimant after objecting to the tribunal’s jurisdiction on the ground of lack
of written arbitration agreement between the parties. This is because the submission
of substantive claims and the relevant pleadings without objecting to the issue of
jurisdiction will be viewed as voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the arbitral
tribunal.
The issues arising from written requirements do not usually happen in an
institutional arbitration. This is because parties are usually required to sign the
terms of reference,123 despite the fact there is no written arbitration agreement. In
such a situation, the terms of reference can be viewed as a written arbitration
agreement between the parties even if the losing party later raised the objection
due to lack of written arbitration agreement. This is because the terms of reference
can be interpreted as a waiver of its right to object on jurisdiction grounds.
However, such presumption will not sustain the attack raised by one party who
participated the arbitration proceedings but expressly objected to the tribunal’s
jurisdiction on the ground of non-existence of written arbitration agreement.
More problems may arise in an ad hoc arbitration which sees no duty for both
parties to complete the terms of reference as a condition to initiate arbitration
proceedings. There may be a situation where the claimant commenced an ad hoc
arbitration, though the respondent took part in the proceedings but raised an
objection to the jurisdiction at the stage of enforcement under arts II and IV of the
New York Convention.
Putting these potential issues in the context of the survey, no foreseeable
difficulties can be seen if an arbitration based on an oral arbitration agreement is
held in a jurisdiction which has no form requirements for arbitration agreements,
such as France or Scotland and the winning party wishes to make a request for
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards in a jurisdiction, such as New
Zealand, which does not require the arbitration agreement to be submitted as
evidence. With New Zealand as the enforcing court, both ss.7(1) and 35(1) of
Arbitration Amendments Act 2006 allows the parties not to rely on a written
arbitration agreement at both stages as stated before.
However, a different conclusion will be drawn upon if an arbitration based on
an oral agreement is held in one of the jurisdictions which imposes no form
requirements for arbitration agreement but the recognition and enforcement of the
arbitral award is sought in another country which requires the party relying on the
123 ICC Rules 2012 art.23
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arbitral awards to submit the original arbitration agreement or a certified copy of
it as evidence. Under these circumstances, the party applying for recognition and
enforcement of the arbitral award may face difficulties in providing the court with
the required arbitration agreement in order to satisfy the evidential proceedings.
Suppose, an arbitration based on an oral arbitration agreement is held in New
Zealand which imposes no written requirement but recognition and enforcement
of award is sought in 1 of the 83 countries which requires arbitration agreements
to be in writing or in one of the eighty two jurisdictions which requires the original
copy of arbitration agreement or a certified copy of it to be supplied to fulfil the
evidential requirements for the application of recognition and enforcement of
convention awards. Under these circumstances, the winning party to the award
made in NewZealandwill not be able to satisfy the relevant evidential requirements
or the form requirements imposed to obtain the recognition and enforcement of
convention awards in those jurisdictions.
The latter scenario represents an omission in the Scottish and French laws in
terms of the evidence required to be submitted for recognition and enforcement
request, considering that both jurisdictions allow oral arbitration agreement to be
the legal basis for the jurisdiction of arbitration. In France, referring to international
arbitral awards, it is confusing that an oral arbitration agreement is recognised as
a valid form to initiate arbitration proceedings but the arbitration agreement is still
required as evidence for recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards. Accordingly,
art.1514 of the French 2011 Decree requires the party relying on the award to
prove the existence of the award before the award can be recognised. It stipulates:
“An arbitral award shall be recognised or enforced in France if the party
relying on it can prove its existence and if such recognition or enforcement
is not manifestly contrary to international public policy.”
Furthermore, its existence has to be proven by “producing the original awards,
together with the arbitration agreement, or duly authenticated copies of such
documents” in accordance with art.1515.124 A similar problem can also be caused
by the application of s.21 of the Scottish Arbitration Law 2010 which reads:
“A person seeking recognition or enforcement of a Convention award must
produce (a) the duly authenticated original award (or a duly certified copy of
it), and (b) the original arbitration agreement (or a duly certified copy of it).”
As discussed, to arbitrate on the basis of an oral arbitration agreement and seek
recognition and enforcement of the award in another jurisdiction may not incur
any problems if both parties mutually agreed and fully participated arbitration
proceedings. This is because the losing party’s full participation can be interpreted
as a voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of arbitration. If there are any doubts,
both parties can even conclude a written arbitration agreement before the arbitration
proceedings in order to fulfil the requirements imposed by art.II of New York
Convention. Problems will certainly arise if the losing party did not take part in
the arbitration proceedings or simply participated under the objection to the
tribunal’s jurisdiction on the ground of invalidity of arbitration agreement. If this
happens, the winning party will not be able to obtain co-operation from the losing
124The New French Decree 2011 art.1515
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party to prove the existence of the oral agreement. Consequently, the winning
party will not be able to fulfil the written requirements under art.II and the evidential
requirements imposed by art.IV of the New York Convention.
The impacts of art.VII of the New York Convention on written
requirements
On the face of it, New Zealand, Scotland and France appear to have moved too
fast than what the New York Convention intends to facilitate. However, the
conclusion cannot be drawn without examining the issue of oral arbitration
agreement from the perspective of art.VII of the Convention. Article VII reads:
“The provisions of the present Convention shall not affect the validity of
multilateral or bilateral agreements concerning the recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards entered into by the Contracting states nor
deprive any interested party of any right he may have to avail himself of an
arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties
of the country where such award is sought to be relied upon.”
This provision sets out the principle of “more favourable law” or “more favourable
right” which allows the winning party to take advantage of more lenient local law
than the provisions of the New York Convention. Putting this into the context of
the written requirements, suppose, an arbitration is held in a jurisdiction or is
subject to the law requiring arbitration agreement to be in writing but the request
for recognition and enforcement is made in another jurisdiction which does not
require a written arbitration agreement, i.e. does not strictly follow the minimum
requirements imposed by art.IV of the New York Convention. Very likely, under
these circumstances, the award under an oral agreement will be enforced by such
enforcing court. But, does this mean that the enforcing court has breached its
obligations under the convention or a solution can be resolved by the application
of art.VII of New York Convention?
The traditional view
Traditionally, the signatory countries of the New York Convention are expected
to follow the duty imposed by the Convention to every letter. The success and
popularity enjoyed by international commercial arbitration lies in art.I of the New
York Convention 1958 (the Convention) which establishes a framework of
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards among the signatory countries and
imposes them obligations to recognise and enforce the arbitral awards made in
another signatory country.125 It reads:
“This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards made in the territory of a State other than State where the recognition
and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of differences
between persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to arbitral
125More discussions, see Hong-Lin Yu, “Is the Territorial Link between Arbitration and the Country of Origin
Established by Articles I and V (1) (e) Being Distorted by the Application of Article VII of the NewYork Convention?”
(2002) 5 International Arbitration Law Review 196
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awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition
and enforcement are sought.”
The wording of “made in the territory of a State” is a clear intention to anchor
international commercial arbitration to the place where arbitration is held. Such
design was seen as a limited notion slowing down the progressive idea of truly
international arbitral awards. Since 1958, this limited notion has dominated the
practice of arbitration by emphasising the importance of the involvement of national
law. For instance, supporting the territorial link between arbitration and states in
geographical term, van der Berg stated that
“arbitration, international as it may be, needs at least a supporting judicial
authority (autroité d’appui), which is, failing an international authority
competent in this respect, necessarily a national court. For example, the
assistance of a national court may be needed for the appointment, replacement
or challenge of an arbitrator.”126
He also directly pointed out that such a link shall exist between arbitration and the
country where the arbitration is held, because
“it is a generally accepted principle of the international division of judicial
competence that the court of the country under the arbitration law of which
the arbitration is to take, is taking or took place, is the competent judicial
authority in relation to arbitration. If the applicability of an arbitration law is
excluded, it will be difficult to find such court.”127
By saying
“… it is to be noted that none of the arbitral institutions which are specialised
in international commercial arbitrations provide that the arbitrations conducted
under their Arbitration Rules are entirely detached from the ambit of any
national arbitration law”,128
he dismissed the argument invoking the idea that the avenue of “internationalised”
arbitration was opened by arbitration rules of an arbitral institution.
Putting this view in the context of written requirements, the traditional view
demands arbitration agreements to fulfil the written requirements stipulated in the
law governing arbitration agreement, the law of the place of arbitration and
furthermore, the law of the enforcing court. If any of these laws dictate the written
requirements, then an arbitration agreement is required to be in writing. Otherwise,
the award made on the basis of lack of written formalities will risk being set aside
by the court of place of arbitration and may further be refused by the enforcing
court under art.V(1)(e) of the New York Convention.
126van der Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958. Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation (1981),
p.30.
127van der Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958. Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation (1981),
p.30.
128van der Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958. Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation (1981),
p.31.
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Interpreting the legal status of oral arbitration agreements under
art.VII of the New York Convention
However, following the reasoning given by the French court in Hilmarton case
and US court in Chromalloy case related to the issue whether the enforcing court
should enforce an award which has been set aside in its country of origin, the
French and the US courts took a different approach in interpreting their obligations
under the New York Convention and their domestic laws. The purpose of this
section is to use the reasoning applied in both case to give the written requirements
a different interpretation. InHilmarton case, theCour d’appel in Paris, in December
1991, decided to affirm the leave of enforcement granted by the Tribunal de Grande
Instance of Paris and held that, according to art.VII(1) of the Convention, the judge
may not refuse to enforce unless the national law so authorises as well as the
provisions of the Convention do not deprive a party of the right it may have to
avail itself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law
of the country where such award is sought to be relied upon. Based on art.VII, the
Court decided to uphold the more favourable right principle under art.VII of the
Convention and recognised the award as the ground listed in art.V(1)(e) of the
Convention does not exist in art.1502 of the 1981 Decree. The court upheld:
“Considering that French law on international arbitration does not oblige a
French judge to take into account an annulment decision on the award given
within the framework of the foreign internal order, and that, hence the
incorporation in the French legal order of an award which was rendered in
international arbitration and which was annulled abroad on the basis of local
law, is not contrary to international public policy within the meaning of
Art.1520(5) of the New Code of Civil Procedure.”
Referring to the French Hilmarton case, van der Berg believed that it is so French
unilateral system providing the basis for such enforcement. He commented:
“The main reason for which no effect needs to be given in France to an
annulment of an award by a court in the country of origin seems to be the
view that in international arbitration an arbitral award is not incorporated in
the legal order of the country where the award is merely located
geographically. The French system for the recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards made in another country is a so-called unilateral system. The
incorporation of the arbitral award into the French legal order is defined by
French law only. These rules are territorial in nature. As is characteristic of
the unilateral approach, these rules are not concerned with the incorporation
of an award in a foreign legal order, even if the latter is the place where the
award has been made. The question of whether the arbitral award is
incorporated in another legal system does not play any role. The rational of
this system is that an arbitral award which is acceptable to a French judge
should not be refused force and effect because a foreign judge has different
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ideas about its acceptability. Furthermore, in France, the notion of the
nationality of an award does not exist.”129
The same message was delivered by Chromolloy case, following the same line of
the arguments given in the Hilmarton case, by resorting art.VII of the Convention
and art.1502 of the 1981 Decree, the court expressed that the winning party in this
case was entitled to avail itself of the more favourable right principle for
enforcement in the domestic law according to art.VII of the Convention as well
as the annulment of the award in its country of origin is not regarded as one of the
grounds for non-recognition or enforcement in France under art.1502 of the 1981
Decree.
The USDistrict Court, District of Columbia granted the recognition of the award
in July 1996, despite that the award was annulled in the country of origin. According
to the court, its decision was supported by three pillars. The court, first of all,
established the need to protect the winning party’s rights in seeking recognition
and enforcement under the domestic law regime. Secondly, the reason for setting
the award aside in Cairo was not one of the grounds for refusal of recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards under the US domestic law. Consequently, the
decision made by the Egyptian court was not regarded as a good foreign court
judgement by the US court and should not have binding force in the US courts.
Finally, the court believed that art.VII of the Convention allows the winning party
to rely on the application of domestic law that are more favourable to the
recognition of foreign awards than those established under the Convention regime.
This is because art.VII of the Convention provide the enforcing parties all rights
to enforcement of his award that it would have in the absence of the Convention
and this provision shall not be seen as a contradiction from the discretionary
standard provided in art.V(1)(e).
While Gaillard pointed out that “in so doing the ruling opened the door by
applying the more favourable right” principle to the recognition in France of an
award set aside in the country of origin”,130 this view went against the traditional
view which maintains that the enforcement cannot be pursued on the basis of the
Convention.131 For instance, Carbonneau criticised theChromalloy decision handed
down by the US court in the following terms:
“The exercise of would-be discretion under Art.V could destablise the
transborder framework for enforcement established by the Convention.
Moreover, the meaning and effect that the court affixes to the language of
Art.VII could not have been part of the intent of the drafters of the Convention
and has not been part of the contemporary decisional practice under the
Convention. Evaluated from the standard point of the orderliness and stability
129Albert Jan van der Berg “Annulment of awards in international arbitration” in Richard B. Lillich and Charles
N. Brower (eds), International Arbitration: In the 21st Century: towards “Judicialization” and Uniformity? Twelfth
Sokol Colloquium (Martinus Nijhoff, 1994), pp.151–152.
130Emmanuel Gaillard “Enforcement of Awards Set Aside in the Country of Origin: The French Experience” in
Albert Jan van der Berg (ed.), ICCA Congress Series Improving the efficiency of Arbitration Agreements and Awards-
40 Years of Application of the New York Convention (Kluwer, 1999), p.16.
131van der Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958. Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation (1981),
pp.173–174.
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of governing norms, the court’s tendencious interpretative pragmatism renders
the Convention framework chaotic.”132
Similar doubts were also expressed by Gharavi who believed that Hilmarton
exposed the weakness of the delocalisation theory as difficulties can arise when
annulment is not effective in the country of enforcement because
“enforcing set aside awards may result in coexistence of two conflicting
awards concerning the same issues between the same parties, and thus violate
the intended uniformity of the convention and damage the image of
international commercial arbitration.”133
Bringing these debates into the discussion concerning written requirements, art.VII
not only throws a lifeline to the awards made on the basis of oral agreements which
do not meet the requirements of arts II and IV of the Convention, but also provide
a sound legal basis for enforcement of such kind of awards. Theremay be a situation
where an award was made on the basis of an oral arbitration agreement in a
jurisdiction requiring written requirements but the request for recognition and
enforcement of such award was made in a jurisdiction where written requirements
are not demanded. Though there may be a risk of being set aside at the place of
arbitration for not satisfying the written requirements but the justification for
granting recognition and enforcement by the enforcing court can be found on the
basis of the “more favourable right principle” in accordance with art.VII (1) of the
New York Convention.134
This interpretation can find support in van der Berg’s revised view on the
principle of “more favourable law” as it indeed can be argued that the Convention
confers upon a court the discretionary power to recognise and enforce an a-national
award under the Convention.135 Acknowledging that an enforcing court does have
residual discretionary power to decide whether it has to refuse recognition or
enforcement of the awards if one of the grounds for refusal stated in art.V of the
Convention is present, he stated that such discretionary power can be exercised if
the respondent invoking the ground for refusal can be deemed to be estopped from
invoking the ground, the defect is insignificant; or it would not have led to a
different result.136
The application of the more favourable right principle stipulated in art.VII can
provide enforcement of awards which was set aside at the place of arbitration for
failing to meet the written requirements in a jurisdiction which has more lenient
form requirements for arbitration agreements. However, the more favourable right
principle will not be able to help with the awards which was made in a jurisdiction
requiring no written requirements, but needed to be enforced in a jurisdiction which
132Thomas Carbonneau, “Debating the proper role of national law under the New York Arbitration Convention”
[1998] 6 Tulane Journal International and Comparative Law 277, 279.
133Hamid G Gharavi, “Chromalloy: another view” [1997] 12 Int’l Arc. Rep. 21.
134van der Berg, The New York Arbitration Convention of 1958. Towards a Uniform Judicial Interpretation (Kluwer
Law International, 1981), p.174.
135Gaillard “Enforcement of Awards Set Aside in the Country of Origin: The French Experience” in Jan van der
Berg (ed.), ICCA Congress Series Improving the efficiency of Arbitration Agreements and Awards- 40 Years of
Application of the New York Convention (1999), p.28.
136Gaillard “Enforcement of Awards Set Aside in the Country of Origin: The French Experience” in Jan van der
Berg (ed.), ICCA Congress Series Improving the efficiency of Arbitration Agreements and Awards- 40 Years of
Application of the New York Convention (1999), p.28.
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requires written requirements to be fulfilled. Due to this background, a call has
been made for a new Convention addressing these issues.
Can the Hypothetical Draft Convention resolve the issues
associated with oral arbitration agreement?
The analysis of the application and interactions between national arbitration laws
and arts II and IV of the New York Convention clearly shows a high degree of
discrepancy among different jurisdictions. While art.VII provides a way out for
this situation by invoking the “more favourable right2 principle, its effects are
only limited to the award that wishes to rely on themore lenient law of the enforcing
court. Consequently, a call for a revision of the New York Convention was made
in the 2009 ICCA conference. In this conference, van der Berg ignited the debates
on the need for a revised convention. In relation to the issue concerning written
requirements, the Hypothetical Draft Convention 2008 (the Draft Convention)
suggests to abolish the written requirements stipulated in art.II of the Convention
in order to get in line with the amended art.7 of the Model Law as well as taking
account of the new trend in removing written requirements in the newly enacted
national arbitration laws. In van der Berg’s own words:
“It is submitted that requirements for the form of the arbitration agreement
are no longer needed. Actually modern arbitration laws are gradually
abandoning the requirement of the written form, treating the arbitration clause
on the same footing as other clauses in a contract (see the recent discussion
at UNCITRAL, resulting in alternative options for the definition and form of
the arbitration agreement in Art.7 of the UNCITRAL Model Law , at the
thirty-ninth session in 2006). The Draft Convention follows this trend by no
longer imposing an internationally required written form. Rather, as is the
case under the NewYork Convention in other respects regarding the arbitration
agreement, the Draft Convention refers to the applicable law for questions
concerning the validity of the arbitration agreement. The applicable law may
include provisions similar to the revised Art.7 of the UNCITRAL Model
Law.”137
The only reference to the formality of arbitration agreement in the Draft Convention
is made in art.2(2)(b) which contains one of the grounds allowing the court to deal
with the dispute and not referring the parties to arbitration. The reference to written
requirements in arts II and IV of the New York Convention was deleted in the
Draft Convention. The intention of this provision is to relax the formalities of
arbitration agreements imposed upon by the application of art.II(1) of the New
York Convention. Article 2(2)(b) reads:
“The court shall not refer the dispute to arbitration is the party against whom
the arbitration agreement is invoked assert and proves that there is prima facie
137 Jan van der Berg, “Hypothetical Draft Convention on International Enforcement of arbitration Agreements and
Awards” in Albert Jan van der Berg (ed.), 50 years of the New York Convention - ICCA International arbitration
Conference (2009), p.654.
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no valid arbitration agreement under the law of the country where the award
will be made…”,138
Removing the discretion enjoyed by the law of the place of arbitration under
art.II(1) of the New York Convention, this particular draft provision not only
removes the written requirements of arbitration agreement but also designates the
enforcing court as “the only court” to determine the validity of the arbitration
agreement when the recognition and enforcement is sought.
In relation to party’s obligations to supply the enforcing court a copy of the
arbitration agreement under art.IV of the New York Convention is also removed
in art.4 of the Draft Convention. Accordingly, art.4 of the Draft Convention does
not oblige the party seeking enforcement of the award to supply the arbitration
agreement or a copy of it. The only document the party who wish to apply for the
recognition and enforcement of the award requires is the original arbitral award
under art.4(2).139 The abandonment of the submission of arbitration agreements
represents the liberalization of evidential proceedings as seen in the amendment
made in art.35(2) of the UNCITRALModel Law in 2006, in which the presentation
of a copy of the arbitration agreement is no longer required for enforcement of the
award irrespective of the country of origin. 140
It has been said that the tribunal should always measure the formal validity of
the arbitration agreement against the standard contained in art.II,141 nevertheless,
the tribunal is contracted to apply the applicable laws, not the New York
Convention, to determine the disputes. There may be a case where the arbitration
agreement does not meet the formality requirements of art.II of the New York
Convention but satisfies the more lenient standard of the applicable law at the seat
of arbitration. In such a case, the tribunal may incline to apply the applicable law
to establish its jurisdiction to ensure the award is not set aside by the competent
court of where the award was made under art.V(1)(e). However, doubts will be
raised at the stage of enforcement for failing to satisfy the requirements set in arts
II and IV of the New York Convention.
There may be a situation where an award may encounter difficulty if the
arbitration agreement meets the formality requirements of art.II of the New York
Convention but does not satisfy the local requirements of the enforcing court.
Under these circumstances, the questions which demand answers are: Who sets
138 Jan van der Berg, “Hypothetical Draft Convention on International Enforcement of arbitration Agreements and
Awards” in Albert Jan van der Berg (ed.), 50 years of the New York Convention - ICCA International arbitration
Conference (2009), p.667.
139The Draft Convention art.4 reads:
“1. Fulfilment of the conditions set forth in this article entitles the party seeking enforcement to be granted
enforcement of the arbitral award, unless the court finds that a ground for refusal is present under the
conditions set forth in articles 5 and 6.
2. The party seeking enforcement shall supply to the court the original of the arbitral award.
3. Instead of an original of the arbitral award, the party seeking enforcement may submit a copy certified
as conforming to be the original. The certification shall be in such form as directed by the court.
4. If the arbitral award is not in an official language of the court before which enforcement is sought, the
party seeking enforcement shall, at the request of the other party or the court, submit a translation. The
translation shall be in such form as directed by the court.”
140The Amendments of the Model Law art.35(2) provides: “The party relying on an award or applying for its
enforcement shall supply the original award or a copy thereof. If the award is not made in an official language of this
State, the court may request the party to supply a translation thereof into such language.” Also see, Jan van der Berg,
“Hypothetical Draft Convention on International Enforcement of arbitration Agreements and Awards” in Jan van der
Berg (ed.), 50 years of the New York Convention - ICCA International arbitration Conference (2009), p.659.
141Lew and Mistelis, Comparative International Commercial Arbitration (2003), para.6-48
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the requirements? Is the Convention or the national law? If so, what requirements?
Is it the maximum or the minimum requirements? A study on the various national
laws on written requirements has shown that some of the signatory countries of
the New York Convention did not implement the relevant provisions of the
Convention to every letter. Consequently, discrepancy and confusion have arisen.
However, considering harmonisation of the relevant provisions on recognition and
enforcement of arbitral awards in different jurisdictions is the main aim of the
New York Convention when it was introduced, it is reasonable to assume that the
Convention did intend to create a universal standard to be followed by all signatory
countries. To achieve this, the Convention should set the maximum requirements
with a universal character implemented by all signatory countries so parties could
have access the same requirements imposed by the New York Convention
framework in all signatory countries where the recognition and enforcement is
sought. While the requirements laid down in the Convention are interpreted as the
maximum requirements and so implemented, national arbitration laws can enact
more lenient provisions than the ones in the Convention if they wish but no more
stringent standards than the New York Convention shall be introduced. With such
an interpretation, there will be space for the interpretation of ‘residual power’ and
the application of art.VII of the New York Convention allowing an award which
was made in a jurisdiction requires written arbitration agreement to be enforced
in a jurisdiction, does not require any formality of arbitration agreement and supply
a copy of arbitration agreement as evidence.
However, within the current arbitration framework, the suggested maximum
requirements of the New York Convention are not followed. Consequently, it may
not assist the awards which are made in a jurisdiction requiring no form for
arbitration agreement, but the recognition and enforcement of such an award is
sought in a jurisdiction which follows the New York Convention or has stricter
requirements than those in the New York Convention. This situation was caused
by the confusion concerning the standard the New York Convention intends to
impose. The confusion created a situation where written requirements are given
different interpretation by various national arbitration laws. This has defeated the
purpose of the creation of the New York Convention. Consequently, the argument
for a revised New York Convention was made. However, before moving towards
the Draft Convention, one has to realise that, despite the tremendous success of
the NewYork Convention, discrepancy existing in the implementation of the New
York Convention among different jurisdictions has brought international arbitration
to a national level. Consequently, harmonisation is not achieved in terms of
formality of arbitration agreement within the current system. Similar discrepancy
will happen again if the discretion is left to the enforcing court to determine the
validity of arbitration agreement as suggested by the Draft Convention. Perhaps
a provision like Option 2 of art.7 of the amended Model Law, which expressly
requires no formality of arbitration agreement, should be added to the Draft
Convention as well as an insertion of a provision stipulating the function of
maximum requirements intended by the Draft Convention. These two provisions
may ensure the harmonisation of the national arbitration laws governing the written
requirements. If appropriate, the application of less stringent local standard by the
enforcing court will be allowed under art.7 which reads:
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“If an arbitration agreement or arbitral award can be enforced on a legal basis
other than this Convention in the country where the agreement or award is
invoked, a party seeking enforcement is allowed to rely on such basis.”
Without these two additional provisions being added to the Draft Convention, it
will allow the signatory countries enacting and applying more stringent
requirements to determine the formality of arbitration agreement, furthermore,
bringing international arbitration back to the national level. But this time, it would
be the level of enforcing court!
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